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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Sandra Sperino’s article, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort,1 
makes a valuable contribution to the debate about the proper interpretation of 
Title VII and other employment discrimination laws in light of Supreme Court 
trends. Professor Sperino ably describes the way that the Supreme Court has 
used tort concepts increasingly in recent cases,2 even having gone so far as to 
have called employment discrimination statutes federal torts.3 This development 
has created significant concern among scholars,4 including Professor Sperino 
herself.5 
Rather than simply reiterate those concerns, however, in her article 
Professor Sperino adopts a novel approach: she takes the Court at its word, 
spinning out how embracing tort concepts and tort methodology would 
transform discrimination law.6 In sum, she explores how using tort concepts 
could “clarify the roles of intent and causation in discrimination analysis, 
                                                                                                                   
 ∗ Professor of Law and Director, William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law. 
 1 Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 
(2014). 
 2 Id. at 1107. 
 3 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 4 See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 1431, 1459 (2012); Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence 
Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the 
Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193−97 (1993). 
 5 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and 
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199 (2013); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 
(2014). 
 6 See generally Sperino, supra note 1. 
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[should] alter the way courts conceive intent, [should] lower the harm threshold 
for some sexual harassment cases,”7 and would transform current approaches to 
statutory interpretation, allowing the law greater “flexibility to respond to 
changing circumstances.”8 This response essay applauds Professor Sperino’s 
work in this area, her suggestion of a silver lining in a problematic trend, and 
the roadmap she lays out for a more positive trajectory. At the same time, I 
worry that she is unlikely to succeed because the actors she relies upon to effect 
the changes she projects are unwilling to do so. 
II. THE LARGE CONSENSUS THAT DISCRIMINATION LAWS ARE ENFORCED 
TOO NARROWLY 
The path Professor Sperino lays out for the lower courts on what it would 
really mean for discrimination to be a tort is appealing to scholars concerned 
about the way that the federal courts have appeared to have been consistently 
narrowing the reach of employment discrimination statutes. Extensive research 
has shown that employment discrimination plaintiffs fare significantly worse in 
federal court at every possible stage of litigation than plaintiffs in other kinds of 
cases. For example, few employment discrimination cases go to trial.9 When 
they do go to trial, few cases are resolved in favor of employees once the 
appeals process is exhausted.10  
And it is not only scholars who are concerned about the way the Supreme 
Court in particular has narrowed the law. Congress has acted several times to 
amend the discrimination statutes to “fix” them after the Court issued decisions 
that narrowed their scope. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title 
VII to effectively overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Id. at 1107. 
 8 Id. at 1109. 
 9 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment 
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 (1999) (suggesting that only ten percent of 
employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
429, 440−41, 444 (2004) (stating that nearly seventy percent of employment discrimination 
cases settle and plaintiffs win only just over four percent of pretrial adjudications). 
 10 See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 551−54 (2003) (finding 
that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are six times more likely to be reversed than those 
found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The 
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283−84, 309 (1997) (arguing that 
meritorious cases are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment 
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560−61 (2001) (asserting that 
employers prevail in ninety-eight percent of federal court employment discrimination cases 
resolved at the pretrial stage). 
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discrimination on the basis of sex.11 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted 
in part because “the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio . . . has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights 
protections.”12 It also added a provision that gave Title VII and the ADA 
limited extraterritorial reach after the Court had held in EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co. that Title VII only applied in the United States.13 It further 
rejected a limited view of mixed-motives liability adopted in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins.14 And it added a provision to supersede the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies15 that a neutral-appearing seniority 
policy established with discriminatory effect had to be challenged 
immediately.16 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was made necessary in 
Congress’s view because the Supreme Court had “narrowed the broad scope of 
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating the protection 
for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”17 Additionally, “as a 
result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in 
individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments 
are not people with disabilities.”18 Most recently, Congress enacted the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, because:  
[t]he Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co. . . . significantly impair[ed] statutory protections against discrimination in 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138−41 (1976); see 
also Diana Kasdan, Note, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace 
Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309, 321−23 (2001) 
(describing the legislation and the legislative history behind the PDA). 
 12 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1971, 1971 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 13 Id. § 109; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246–47 (1991). 
 14 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107 (providing for liability but no damages relief if 
protected status was a motivating factor in an employment decision but the same decision 
would have been made without considering protected status); see also Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion) (providing for a defense to liability in 
a mixed motives case if the employer could prove it would have made the same decision 
without considering protected status); id. at 260−61 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that 
objective evidence should not be required); id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting 
that causation analysis should be made compatible with the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting framework). 
 15 Lorance v. AT&T Tech., 490 U.S. 900, 911−12 (1989). 
 16 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 112 (“For purposes of this section, an unlawful 
employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual 
becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the 
application of the seniority system or provision of the system.”). 
 17 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also id. §§ 2(a)(5), (b) 
(describing the purpose of the Act). 
 18 Id. § 2(a)(6). 
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compensation that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles 
of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision undermine[d] those 
statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of 
discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation 
decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress . . . . The 
limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory compensation 
claims ignore[d] the reality of wage discrimination and [was] at odds with the 
robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.19 
Individual Supreme Court Justices have also bemoaned the way the Court 
has narrowed the scope of employment discrimination protections. There have 
been a number of high profile dissents in discrimination cases making these 
points,20 but most notable are recent calls by Justice Ginsburg for Congress to 
step in. In her dissent to the Court’s decision in the Ledbetter case, Justice 
Ginsburg stated that “the ball [was] in Congress’ court . . . to correct this 
Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”21 Justice Ginsburg has made similar 
statements in additional cases. In Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nasser, 
and Vance v. Ball State University, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the two 
decisions warped congressional intent so badly that they should “prompt yet 
another Civil Rights Restoration Act.”22 
III. THE TROUBLE WITH COURTS 
The prior section touches on a pattern. Congress creates a discrimination 
statute, over time the federal courts interpret it narrowly, Congress steps in to 
counteract the narrowing, the courts interpret the amendments narrowly, and 
Congress is called to step in again. One of the most appealing parts of Professor 
Sperino’s suggestion is that it disrupts this pattern. First, it doesn’t rely on 
Congress to act at a time when Congress seems incapable of acting23 and when 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(1)–(2), 123 Stat. 5, 5 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 20 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561−62 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 608−09 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 720 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 21 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 660−61 (2007) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting).  
 22 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“The ball is once again in Congress' court to correct the error into which this 
Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the 
Court weakens today.”). 
 23 Paul Kane, Little Time Left for Congress’s To-Do List, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2013, at 
A2 (calling 2013 a record-low year for congressional action); David Welna, As Congress 
Breaks, Inaction Remains Most Notable Action, NPR (Aug. 2, 2014, 8:29 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/08/02/337181198/as-congress-breaks-inaction-
remains-most-notable-action, archived at http://perma.cc/L63L-A88E. 
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congressional action does not seem to have the desired effect.24 Second, it relies 
on the actors most likely to be able to make a change: the lower courts, which 
hear vastly more cases than the Supreme Court with its discretionary docket. 
And third, it advocates for change that the Supreme Court has clearly opened 
the door to. 
An additional virtue of this approach is that it does not get bogged down in 
why the law has developed in the way it has. Starting there is a common 
practice for reformers. In past efforts at reform, many scholars have focused on 
why employment discrimination cases are different from other kinds of cases as 
a way to suggest how Congress could change the law or courts should change 
their practices. Some have posited that plaintiffs are unsuccessful because of 
changes in employer behavior, labeling current forms of discrimination “subtle” 
rather than “overt.”25 Others have mapped doctrinal drift between the goals of 
the statutes when they were initially enacted and their current applications.26 
Still others have linked the drift and plaintiffs’ disproportional losses to the 
liberal use of summary judgment and the change in rules to pleading standards 
under Twombly and Iqbal.27 Each of these approaches has merit, but none has 
yet led to a solution. Focusing first and foremost on a path forward is refreshing 
at the very least. 
                                                                                                                   
 24 See, e.g., Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 717 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for subverting an amendment to Title VII); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“It is strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress homed in on 
retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant protection 
against that unlawful employment practice to have less force than the protection available 
when the statute does not mention retaliation.”).  
 25 E.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 749−51 (2005); Damon Ritenhouse, Where Title VII Stops: Exploring 
Subtle Race Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 87, 87−88 (2013); 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469−89 (2001). But see generally Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination 
in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 
9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2005); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of 
Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657 (2003) (asserting that 
plenty of overt workplace discrimination persists). 
 26 E.g., Brian S. Clarke, A Better Route Through the Swamp: Causal Coherence in 
Disparate Treatment Doctrine, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 727 (2013); Erik J. Girvan & 
Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological Case for Abandoning the 
“Discriminatory Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2013); Lynda 
L. Arakawa & Michele Park Sonen, Note, Caught in the Backdraft: The Implications of 
Ricci v. DeStefano on Voluntary Compliance and Title VII, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 464 
(2010); Allison Cimpl-Wiemer, Comment, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: Letting the Air Out of the 
Continuing Violations Doctrine?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 357 (2008). 
 27 E.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 96−97 (2010); 
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1013−15; J. Scott Pritchard, 
Comment, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of Twombly 
and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and 
Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 774−79 (2011). 
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The drawback to this particular way forward without looking at causes is 
that it does not fully account for the way that lower courts are likely to act. One 
explanation that few were willing to posit for the narrowing of discrimination 
law was judicial animus towards those kinds of claims or other incentives to be 
rid of them. But recent scholarship by a former federal court judge suggests that 
animus and other incentives lie behind at least some of the way that 
discrimination law develops – or fails to develop.  
Nancy Gertner, a Senior Lecturer on Law at Harvard28 and former United 
States District Court Judge, has offered important new insights on why it is that 
employment discrimination cases fare worse than other kinds of cases in three 
recent articles. Her most recent article, The Judicial Repeal of the 
Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s Signature Achievement, offers the most 
developed explanation. She identifies five potential causes of the phenomenon:  
1) judges may believe that discrimination doesn’t exist anymore;  
2) more discrimination cases may be frivolous;  
3) good cases may be taken to state courts because state law is less 
employer friendly;  
4) the Supreme Court may have narrowed the law in a way that protects 
employers; and  
5) the pressures on judges may create and perpetuate biases against these 
cases.29  
Based on her own experiences and others’ studies of judicial decisions, 
Gertner concludes that ideology, particularly as communicated by the Supreme 
Court in its decisions, plays some role. She concludes, though, that the greatest 
causes of the narrowing come from the pressure on judges to manage their 
caseloads and the ways that effects of those pressures magnify those ideological 
factors. This article builds on two of Judge Gertner’s prior articles, Losers’ 
Rules,30 and, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law Dimensions 
of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases.31 
The core contention in these three works revolves around how case 
management practices are driving a wholesale abandonment of the 
antidiscrimination project. 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), HARV. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10303/Gertner (last visited Jan. 6, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/B3ZQ-UW5M. 
 29 Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s 
Signature Achievement 2−4 (Mar. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406671), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R2R7-74PE. 
 30 See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1111_aau9fyvc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MC8X-MCEE. 
 31 See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: 
Thoughts on the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767 (2012−2013). 
28 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE [Vol. 76 
 
Judge Gertner describes two main drivers: asymmetrical processes in 
issuing written decisions and overreliance on heuristics that are linked with 
losing plaintiffs. First, judges are encouraged to resolve cases without trials and 
to write decisions only when absolutely necessary. Because a grant of dismissal 
or judgment disposes of at least part of a case, those decisions must be written 
and must explain the decision’s rationale. So decisions are written only when 
plaintiffs lose.32 That means, the only decisions available to be read by judges 
and litigants are decisions explaining what is wrong with plaintiffs’ cases, 
which creates and reinforces judges’ implicit biases about the merit of 
employment discrimination cases. As Judge Gertner notes, “[i]f case after case 
recites the facts that do not amount to discrimination, decisionmakers have a 
hard time imagining the facts that comprise discrimination.”33  
Second, courts have developed decisionmaking heuristics for employment 
discrimination cases which are employed in only one direction: to avoid false 
positives—wrongful accusations of discrimination. Those heuristics become 
precedent and then supplant the law themselves.34 One particularly vivid 
illustration of such a heuristic is the “stray remarks” doctrine, which trivializes 
sexist and racist speech.35 This doctrine arose as a way to distinguish direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive from circumstantial evidence, with a 
particularly narrow view of direct evidence. Only if no inference at all was 
required to link the plaintiff’s protected class with the decision—e.g., I am not 
hiring you because you are black or female—would the evidence be direct. 
Anything else would be a “stray” remark.36 This heuristic has been employed in 
such a way that now, explicitly gendered or race-linked speech is not considered 
evidence of discrimination or constitutive of harassment at all by judges at the 
summary judgment stage. Conversely when juries hear that this kind of 
language was used, they have ruled for plaintiffs and awarded large damages. 
These awards suggest that those juries interpret this language not only as 
evidence of discrimination or as constituting harassment, but also as an 
indication that the discrimination or harassment is severe.37 Based on 
development of heuristics like this one and in other ways, judges say that they 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Gertner, supra note 29, at 4, 12; see also Gertner, supra note 31, at 110. 
 33 Gertner, supra note 29, at 13. 
 34 Judge Gertner is not alone in making this observation. Both Professor Sperino and I, 
for example, have made similar claims. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and 
Danger of Practicing Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 160−61 (2005) (arguing that 
the test developed in McDonnell Douglas had replaced the prohibition on discrimination in 
Title VII); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 69 
(2011) (arguing that frameworks used for analysis reduce the courts’ work to rote sorting 
that squeezes out arguably cognizable claims) . 
 35 Gertner, supra note 29, at 3−4, 8−10. 
 36 Gertner, supra note 30, at 119−20. 
 37 Gertner, supra note 29, at 8. 
2015] PRETEND FEDERAL COURTS AREN’T HOSTILE 29 
 
feel compelled by Supreme Court decisions and their own prior precedents to 
rule in ever narrower ways.38 
Judge Gertner is not the only person with federal judicial experience writing 
about how the system is broken for employment discrimination cases. She is 
joined by Judge Mark W. Bennett, who has agreed that these structural 
pressures are having an effect,39 and by Judge David F. Hamilton, who also 
agrees and offers the Seventh Circuit’s standard as an antidote.40 The work of 
all three should signal that we ought to be concerned about the way employment 
discrimination cases are treated by the judiciary, and that leaving expansion of 
discrimination law up to judges might pose a problem. 
I am also skeptical that the Supreme Court will take its own lead to expand 
discrimination law to align it further with tort law or by using tort methodology, 
either for its own purposes or to nudge the lower courts along. There are 
circumstances where the Court has had to make clear that the lower courts were 
interpreting the employment discrimination laws too narrowly. In Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, a unanimous Court had to reverse the Fifth 
Circuit and make clear that plaintiffs did not have to provide additional specific 
evidence of discriminatory motive if they could prove the reason given by the 
employer was not worthy of belief.41 Similarly, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
the Court had to explain that there was no special type of evidence required for 
a plaintiff or defendant to use the mixed-motives analytical structure.42 These 
situations, though, have been relatively rare. 
Much more common are actions by the Supreme Court to limit the reach of 
discrimination law and to nudge lower courts in that direction. Some of these 
actions are not obvious. A number of scholars have demonstrated in different 
contexts how the Supreme Court has engaged in analytical sleights of hand to 
resist broad interpretations of discrimination law.  
For example, Sachin Pandya has shown how the Court has effectively 
overruled prior precedent without acknowledging it is doing so through stealth 
erosion.43 An example he gives is the way that the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano 
likely overruled two cases holding that affirmative action was not 
discrimination under Title VII by contravening four necessary implications of 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Id. at 11−12; Gertner, supra note 30, at 109. 
 39 Mark W. Bennet, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” 
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 685, 697−701 (2012–2013). 
 40 Judge David F. Hamilton, On McDonnell Douglas and Convincing Mosaics: Toward 
More Flexible Methods of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, Address to the 
Association of American Law Schools, Section on Employment Discrimination Law 2013 
Annual Meeting, in 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 195, 196−98 (2013). 
 41 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). 
 42 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
 43 Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action 
After Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 286−87 (2010). 
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the holdings in those cases.44 Another example of this phenomenon might be 
present in the way that the Court used the rationale in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services to stealthily erode the holding from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that 
“because of” did not require “but-for” causation, so that the Court could hold 
that in fact it did require "but-for" causation in University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.45 
Deborah Widiss has documented a complementary type of sleight of 
hand—the way that the Court reinvigorates precedent that has been overridden 
by Congress.46 She used Gross to show how the Court had used an amendment 
by Congress to one statute that overrode Supreme Court precedent as a reason 
to interpret other related statutes as embodying that precedent.47 Professor 
Widiss also showed how Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. revived 
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 had amended Title VII to nullify the effect of that decision.48 In additional 
examples, she explained how the lower courts also give life to precedents 
overridden by Congress, creating splits and failing to give effect to Congress’s 
language.49 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on this scholarly work, it is hard for me to see anything but a one-
way ratchet in the judicial branch. The Supreme Court seems focused on using 
doctrines only if they limit the reach of discrimination law, and the lower courts 
magnify those inclinations because of judges’ own ideology about 
discrimination law and the way that ideology is reinforced through judicial 
practices. So while I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Sperino’s insights 
into what it would mean for discrimination law if courts were to embrace tort 
principles completely, I fear that her roadmap will not be followed.  
That does not mean we should not try, however. No suggestions for reform 
seem significantly more likely to be successful. Some of the other suggestions 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Id. at 299 (arguing that the two cases affected were Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979)); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 45 See Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705, 716−17 (2014) (arguing that the 
decision in Nassar undermined the approach in Gross by relying on it to interpret Title VII 
based on the ADEA, when in Gross the Court had said it could not rely on Title VII to 
interpret the ADEA). 
 46 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513 (2009) 
[hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional 
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860 (2012) 
[hereinafter Widiss, The Hydra Problem]. 
 47 Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 46, at 860−63. 
 48 Widiss, Shadow Precedent, supra note 46, at 542−46. 
 49 Id. at 546−56. 
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for reform are worth highlighting here. It is frequently argued that Congress 
should amend the discrimination laws to “fix” Supreme Court decisions that 
interpret them narrowly.50 Judges face structural pressures that cause them to 
limit the substance of the law, and these pressures create a self-perpetuating 
spiral away from the goals of the employment discrimination statutes.  To 
counter these pressures, Judge Gertner suggests that amendments by Congress 
could use broader language that cabins judicial discretion.51 Another suggestion 
along these lines, by Bill Corbett, urges Congress to stop making patchwork 
amendments and instead thoroughly overhaul our statutory approach to 
discrimination law.52 
An alternative recommendation could be for more or different judicial 
education. Scholars could monitor judicial decisions, like one study of decisions 
from the Northern District of Georgia, showing that summary judgment was 
granted for defendants on at least one issue in 95% of cases, in an effort to 
reveal to judges their own patterns.53 Seeing those patterns might be a way to 
de-bias the judges’ anti-antidiscrimination-law attitudes.54 Judge Gertner herself 
is currently undertaking a larger study like the Georgia one.55  
None of these recommendations is inconsistent with the approach 
recommended by Professor Sperino, and in fact may complement it. Her 
suggestions don’t rely solely on the courts, but also create opportunities for 
litigants. Advocates who incorporate her arguments may see success in the 
lower courts. Tort principles may actually have more traction than amendments 
to Title VII which may incorporate principles less linked to the common law. 
The fact that tort law is one of the law’s core subject matters means that judges 
are likely quite comfortable with its principles and its methodology. Moreover, 
there is a much larger body of law to draw on, law that is shaped by remarkable 
consensus through the Restatement and state law together. These factors suggest 
that exploiting the tortification of discrimination law might be more fruitful than 
other routes for reform. 
The only other discrimination- and litigation-specific recommendation for 
reform that has been suggested is to consider an enforcement scheme that 
                                                                                                                   
 50 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing Justice Ginsburg’s calls to 
Congress). 
 51 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14. 
 52 William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook 
and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136 (2013). 
 53 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14.  
 54 Judges appear to overestimate their freedom from biases, and a first step to 
countering the effect of those biases is to have their existence demonstrated. See CHERYL 
STAATS ET AL., KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE OHIO ST. UNIV., 
STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013, at 39−40, 53−54, 59−60 (2013), 
available at 
http://www.issuelab.org/resource/state_of_the_science_implicit_bias_review_2013, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q7D2-6XNY. 
 55 Gertner, supra note 29, at 6. 
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doesn’t rely on the federal courts.56 Judge Gertner suggested exploring whether 
giving an agency staffed with subject matter experts who possess the power to 
adjudicate discrimination claims might be a better option.57 I made this 
suggestion a number of years ago, and have explored it in some depth.58 In my 
view, such an agency could better enforce the antisubordination goals of Title 
VII, better balance employer and employee interests, provide greater access to 
justice for low and medium wage employees, and better adapt to changing 
norms of equality.  
On the other hand, structuring an agency with such a large mandate and 
staffing it to run efficiently is a daunting task, as is expecting Congress to create 
something like this in the foreseeable future. Despite the appeal of an agency 
model as an ideal, because of its impracticality, pursing that strategy seems 
unwise. As an alternative in conjunction with other compatible reform efforts, 
Professor Sperino's suggestion that the lower courts be pushed into accepting 
other tort principles and tort methodology seems promising. I hope they take her 
up on it in the ways that she suggests. 
                                                                                                                   
 56 See Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment 
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
409, 417−18 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) (advocating reforms that 
would allow greater use of private alternative dispute resolution methods in discrimination 
cases). 
 57 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14. 
 58 Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 39 (2011); Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping 
Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. 
LABOR & EMP. L. 193, 195 (2009). 
